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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
PROTECT1 ON AGAINST RAD l AT1 ON 
By Robert A .  English,* R ichard  E. Benson, 
J. V e r n o n  Bailey, and Char les M. Barnes  
Manned Spacecraft Center  
SUMMARY 
Radiation was not an operational problem during the Apollo Program. Doses 
received by the crewmen of Apollo missions 7 to 15 were small because no major 
solar -particle events occurred during those missions. One small event was  detected 
by a radiation sensor outside the Apollo 12  spacecraft, but no increase in radiation dose 
to the crewmen inside the spacecraft was detected. Solar -particle re leases  a r e  random 
events, and it is possible that a flare, with the accompanying energetic nuclear parti-  
cles,  may hinder future flights beyond the magnetosphere. 
Radiation protection for the Apollo Program w a s  focused on both the peculiarities 
Radiation-exposure r isks  
of the natural space radiation environment and the increased prevalence of manmade 
radiation sources on the ground and on board the spacecraft. 
to crewmen were assessed and balanced against mission gain to determine mission 
constraints. Operational radiation evaluation required specially designed radiation- 
detection systems on board the spacecraft in addition to the use of satellite data, solar 
observatory support, and other liaison. 
Control and management of radioactive sources and radiation-generating equip- 
ment have been important in minimizing radiation exposure of ground-support person- 
nel, researchers ,  and the Apollo flight and backup crewmen. Problems of radiation 
protection that influence space flights as well as ground operations a r e  discussed and 
the solutions do cum ente d. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Apollo experience in radiation protection includes two distinct areas:  space, 
where the largest  and most critical radiation sources a r e  virtually uncontrollable, and 
ear th  , where most radiation sources of appreciable strength are manmade and con- 
trollable. The basic philosophy of radiation protection in these two areas remains the 
*Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, Houston, Texas. 
same;  that is, to avoid harmful effects of radiation by limiting the radiation dose to the 
lowest level judged consistent with the achievement of beneficial goals. 
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Although the Apollo missions have placed men outside the protective geomagnetic 
shielding and have subjected them to types of ionizing radiation seldom encountered in 
earth environment, radiation doses to Apollo crewmen have been minimal (table I). 
Spacecraft transfer from low earth orbit to translunar coast necessitates t raverse  of 
the regions of geomagnetically trapped electrons and protons known as the Van Allen 
belts. When beyond these belts, the spacecraft and crewmen a r e  continuously subjected 
to high-energy cosmic rays (ref. 1) and to varying probabilities of particle bursts  f rom 
the sun (fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. - Radiation-dose estimates for particle events between June 1968 and 
December 1969. 
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In table I, the tabulated radiation doses a re  the averages of all readings on the 
thermoluminescent dosimeters for the respective mission. Individual dosimeter read- 
ings have varied approximately 20 percent from the average because of variations in 
the shielding effectiveness of the Apollo spacecraft and the differences in duties, move- 
ments, and locations of the crewmen. Doses to blood-forming organs a r e  approximate- 
ly 40 percent lower than the values measured at  the body surface. In comparison with 
the doses actually received, the maximum operational dose (MOD) limit for each of the 
Apollo missions was set at 400 rads (X-ray equivalent) to skin and 50 rads to the blood- 
forming organs. 
TABLE I. - AVERAGE RADIATION DOSES O F  






















Van Allen Belts 
The problem of protection against the natural radiations of the Van Allen belts 
was  recognized before the advent of manned space flight. The simplified solution is to 
remain under the belts (below an altitude of approximately 300 nautical miles) when in 
earth orbit and to traverse the belts rapidly on the way to outer space. In reality, the 
problem is somewhat more complex. The radiation belts vary in altitude over various 
par ts  of the ear th  and a r e  absent over the north and south magnetic poles. A particu- 
larly significant portion of the Van Allen belts is a region known as the South Atlantic 
anomaly (fig. 2). Over the South Atlantic region, the geomagnetic field draws particles 
closer to the earth than in other regions of the globe. The orbit inclination of a space- 
craft  determines the number of passes made per day through this region and, thus, 
determines the radiation dose that will accompany these passes for a set altitude and 
~ spacecraft shielding. 
3 
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Figure 2. - Isodose profile showing high- 
dose region over the South Atlantic 
(values a r e  in mrads/day at an altitude 
of 210 km). 
A major camplication concerning 
radiation stability within the belts (includ- 
ing the South Atlantic anomaly portion) is a 
result  of high-altitude nuclear detonations. 
In 1962, the United States detonated a 
1. 5-megaton thermonuclear device (Proj- 
ect Starfish) in a portion of the Van Allen 
belt region and caused the radiation levels 
within the belts to rise significantly. By 
1969, the high -energy electron component 
of the injected radiation had decayed to only 
one-twelfth of the 1962 intensity. 
small  amount of time spent in earth orbit 
and the rapid t raverse  of the radiation belts 
during Apollo missions have minimized 
astronaut radiation dose from the remain- 
ing Starfish electrons. However, recur - 
rence of high-altitude nuclear testing would 
The 
have a significant impact on Apollo earth-orbit operations, and this possibility has been 
factored into radiation-protection planning for  Apollo space missions. Sources of 
current intelligence information on nuclear-device testing a r e  available to the NASA, 
and these sources a r e  ready to assist in the real-time management of any contingency 
that might be caused by the high-altitude detonation of a nuclear device. 
Particles within the Van Allen belts spiral  around the earth magnetic lines of 
force and, therefore, display directionality. This directionality var ies  continuously in 
angular relationship to the trajectory of the spacecraft. Therefore, dosimetry instru - 
mentation in the Van Allen belts must use relatively omnidirectional radiation sensors  
so that the radiation f l u  will be measured accurately. The Van Allen belt dosimeter 
(VABD) (fig. 3) was designed specifically for Apollo dosimetry within these radiation 
belts and has proved satisfactory because dose values derived from its greater  than 
180" radiation acceptance angle have correlated well with doses indicated by postflight 
analyses of passive dosimeters worn by the crewmen. The nuclear -particle -detection 
system (NPDS) (fig. 4) w a s  designed to have a relatively narrow acceptance angle and 
was intended to measure the isotropic proton and alpha particles derived from solar-  
particle events. Experience with the NPDS within the highly directional radiation fields 
of the Van Allen belts has emphasized the difficulty in determining true flux levels using 
a detector of narrow angle response, There are two problems in determining flux levels. 
First, orientation of the spacecraft relative to the direction of the impinging particles 
is not precisely known at all times. 
inaccuracy would result  from the high statistical e r r o r  inherent with low counting rates 
when the detector is pointed away from the direction of particle flux. 
Second, even if orientation were precisely known, 
A compromise in VABD design was  required for  Apollo flammability considera- 
tions, and this compromise resulted in the use of aluminum as a replacement for 
tissue -equivalent plastic in the ionization-chamber walls, Aluminum is a satisfactory 
replacement for  tissue -equivalent plastic only if electron secondary radiation (brems - 
strahlung) is a small  portion of the total radiation dose (as in the Apollo Program). 
Chambers of tetrafluoroethylene plastic would be preferable to aluminum if flammabil- 
ity remains a design factor for future missions, A detailed discussion of radiation do- 
simetry considerations for post-Apollo missions is contained in references 2 and 3. 
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Figure 3. - Van Allen belt dosimeter. 
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Figure 4. - Nuclear -particle -detection 
system. 
No major solar  -particle events have 
occurred during an Apollo mission (fig. 1). 
Although much effort has been expended in 
the field of solar -event forecasting, indi- 
vidual eruptions from the solar surface a r e  
impossible to forecast. The best that can 
be provided at this time is an estimate of 
particle dose, given visual o r  radio- 
frequency (RF) confirmation that an 
eruption has occurred. A system of solar-  
monitoring stations, the Solar Particle 
Alert Network (SPAN), provides a NASA- 
sponsored network of continuous data on 
solar -flare activity. The various compo- 
nents of this network a r e  described in the 
appendix. Approximately 20 percent of the 
largest solar f lares (importance 2 bright 
o r  larger) wi l l  result  in particle fluxes in 
the earth/moon region that can be related 
in  intensity to early RF  or  visual charac- 
teristics. A warning interval of from l e s s  
than one to several  hours (typically, 2 to 
5 
4 hours) is obtained between the RF/visual indication and the appearance of particles 
in  the earth/moon region. Because only approximately 20 percent of the flares result 
in  particle events, it is not necessary to change normal mission procedures on the 
basis of R F  o r  visual observations alone. Rather, radiation sensors on board solar- 
orbit and earth-orbit satellites, as well as on board the Apollo spacecraft itself, are 
used to confirm the particle event. Only after the appearance of particles is confirmed 
would action be taken to protect the crewmen. For  a typical event, approximately 
8 hours would be available from the time particles a r e  confirmed to the time of peak 
radiation dose. Details concerning effects of solar-particle events on various phases 
TABLE 11. - SOLAR-FLARE RULES FOR APOLLO MISSIONS 
~ ~~ 
Condition 
Major solar f lare has been 
predicted. 
Major solar f lare has  occurred 
Unconfirmed particle event 
has  occurred. 
Confirmed particle event 
and SPAN or real-t ime 
analyses indicate the 
MOD will be exceeded 
during the mission. 
Confirmed particle event 
and spacecraft telemetry 
or personal radiation 
dosimeter read-out 
projections indicate the 
MOD will be exceeded 






All other phases 
Translunar coast 
Lunar orbit  
Lunar stay 




Hold until data analysis 
indicates that the MOD 
will not be exceeded. 
Continue mission. If data 
analysis indicates that 
the MOD will be exceedec 
by a significant amount 
before mission comple- 
tion, translunar injec- 
tion i s  no-go. 
Continue mission. Consid- 
eration will be given to 
early (or extended) 
transearth injection and 
inhibiting crew transfer 
to the lunar module. 
Continue mission. Consid- 
eration should be given 
to entering in next best 
preferred target paint 
if the total dose can be 
reduced significantly 
without increasing total 
r isk to the crew. 
Continue mission. Considei 
extending lunar orbit sta: 
time if the total dose to 
the crew would be r e -  
duced significantly by 
lunar shielding. 
Consider reducing the lunar 
stay time or extravehic- 
ular activities if the tota 
dose to the crew can be 
reduced significantly 
without increasing the 
total r isk to the crew. 
Continue mission. 
Comments 
ieport:  particles have not 
been confirmed. No mis-  
sion impact i s  indicated. 
Translunar injection i s  no-go 
only if f irm computation 
before go/no-go indicates 
more than the MOD. 
Crew should begin personal 
dosimeter and radiation 
survey meter read-outs. 
A projection of greater  
than the MOD is not r e -  
quired for crew read-outs. 
Hatch-down attitude may be 
used to reduce the total 
dose. 
If a particle event i s  con- 
firmed, the crew will 
transfer from the lunar 
module to the command 
and service module. 
Comparison of command and 
service module and lunar 
surface personal radiatior 
dosimeters i s  advised. 
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In t e rms  of hazard to crewmen in the heavy, well-shielded command module, 
even the largest  solar-particle event on record (November 12, 1960) would not have 
caused any impairment of crewmember functions o r  ability of the crewmen to complete 
their mission safely. It is estimated that within the command module during this event 
the crewmen would have received a dose of 60 to 100 rads to their skin and 1 0  to 30 rads 
to their  blood-forming organs (bone and spleen) (refs. 4 and 5). Other estimates have 
indicated that skin dose from this event could have been as high as 270 rads. Radiation 
doses to crewmen while inside the thinly shielded lunar module o r  during an extravehic- 
ular  activity (EVA) would be significantly higher for  such a particle event. The radia- 
tion specialists at the Mission Control Center Space Environment Console, with the 
assistance of SPAN and the other monitoring system described in the appendix, must 
advise the Flight Director and Flight Surgeon of the radiation r i sks  that would be in- 
volved with the event. If doses a r e  projected to be detrimentally high, it would be ad- 
vised that the astronauts not stay in  the lunar module o r  perform EVA during this type 
of particle event. Rules that apply to lunar module stay o r  EVA during such an event 
are indicated in table 11 under the mission phases "Lunar orbit" and "Lunar stay. '' 
' 
Cosmic Rays 
Cosmic-ray fluxes have provided average dose ra tes  of 1 . 0  mr/hr in cislunar 
space and 0.6 mr/hr  on the lunar surface. These values a r e  expected to double at the 
low point in  the 11-year cycle of solar-flare activity (solar minimum) because of de- 
creased solar  magnetic shielding of the central planets. The effect of high-energy 
(but low dose rate) cosmic rays on humans is unknown but is considered by most au- 
thorities to be of relatively minor consequence for exposures of l e s s  than a few years. 
Experimental evidence of the effects of these radiations is dependent on the develop- 
ment of highly advanced particle accelerators or the advent of long-term manned mis- 
sions outside the geomagnetic influence. 
One particular effect possibly resulting from cosmic rays  has been the light- 
flash phenomenon reported on the Apollo 11 and subsequent missions. Although ioniz- 
ing radiations can produce visual phosphenes (subjective sensations best  described as 
flashes of light) of the types reported, a definite correlation has  not been established 
between cosmic rays and the observation of flashes. The light flashes have been de- 
scribed as starlike flashes o r  s t reaks of light that apparently occur within the eye. 
The flashes are observed only when the spacecraft cabin is dark o r  when blindfolds are 
provided and the crewmen a r e  concentrating on detection of the flashes. There is a 
possibility that visual flashes may indicate the occurrence of damage to the brain o r  
eye; however, no damage has been observed among crewmen who have experienced the 
light -flash phenomenon. 
Additional investigations during future Apollo missions a r e  planned to provide a 
better understanding of the cause of the visual light flashes and any possible detrimen- 
tal consequences. These investigations will include careful observations and reporting 
procedures to define the frequencies and characteristics of the visual events. Correla- 
tion of visual events with cosmic-ray flux rates will  be determined by real-time record- 





Neutrons created by cosmic rays  in  collision with lunar materials were postulated 
to be a potential hazard to Apollo crewmen (ref. 6). It has been proposed that the neu- 
tron hazard be evaluated by the use of whole-body activation measurement of crewmen 
to determine the extent of neutron-induced sodium-24 and by use  of neutron- resonant 
metal foils that have a known activation response for the type of neutrons expected. 
Both methods for neutron-dose assessment have been used at the NASA Manned Space- 
c raf t  Center (MSC). Whole-body counting and neutron-resonant foil techniques had 
been initiated on the Apollo 11 mission. The results of these analyses indicated that 
neutron doses were significantly lower than had been anticipated. Activation products 
were below the l imits of detection by whole-body spectroscopy, and activities were ex- 
tremely low even in  the neutron-resonant foils (ref. 7). The whole-body and neutron- 
resonant foil methods of neutron-dose determination have been retained because of the 
remaining potential for  neutron production by solar-event particles or  for  excessive 
crewman exposure to neutrons from the SNAP- 27 radioisotope thermal generator used 
to power the Apollo lunar surface experiments packages. 
OVERALL RADIATION SPECTRUM 
During a complete Apollo mission, astronauts a r e  exposed to widely varying 
fractions of radiations from the Van Allen belts, cosmic rays,  neutrons, and other 
subatomic particles created in high- energy collisions of pr imary particles with space- 
craft materials. In addition, the individual responsibilities of the crewmen differ, and, 
therefore, radiation exposure may differ. 
To allow accurate determination of radiation exposure of the crewman, each 
ca r r i e s  a personal radiation dosimeter (PRD) (fig. 5) and three passive dosimeters 
(fig. 6). The PRD provides visual read-out of accumulated radiation dose to each 
crewman as the mission progresses.  The PRD is approximately the size of a ciga- 
re t te  pack, and pockets a r e  provided in the flight coveralls, as well as in the mace- 
Sensor 
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Figure 5. - Personal radiation dosimeter. 
8 
suyt, for  carrying the PRD. The passive 
dosimeters are placed in the garments that 
are worn throughout the mission. The pas- 
sive dosimeters contain lithium fluoride 
thermoluminescent dosimetry powder, nu- 
clear emulsions, neutron-dosimetry foils, 
and foils for  detection of high-atomic-weight 
cosmic particles. These detector materials 
a r e  analyzed after each mission, and an 
accurate determination of the radiation dose 
to various portions of the body (ankle, thigh, 
and chest) is facilitated. In addition, the 
passive dosimeter provides detailed infor- 
mation on the types of radiation to which 
each astronaut is exposed. 
A radiation- survey meter (RSM) 
(fig. 7) is taken on each Apollo mission. 
Figure 6. - Passive dosimeter with 
component parts.  
Range: linear 
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Figure 7. - Radiation-survey meter. 
The RSM is a direct-reading dose-rate 
instrument that allows the crewmen to de- 
termine radiation levels in any desired loca- 
tion in  their compartment. The crewmen 
would use the RSM to find a habitable low- 
dose region within the spacecraft in the 
event of a radiation emergency. If desired, 
the RSM can be stowed in its wall bracket 
with its meter turned on, so that continuous 
onboard dose-rate read-out may be obtained. 
PROBLEMS INVOLVING RADIATIONS OF MANMADE ORIGIN 
Protection against manmade sources of radiation is a ground- support function 
concerned mainly with the protection of the  ground personnel, the general public, and 
the environment against detrimental effects of ionizing radiation. Much of this effort 
is routine health-physics procedure governed by U. S. Atomic Energy Commission reg- 
ulations (ref. 8) and U. s. Department of Labor standards (ref. 9). However, certain 
problems involving spacecraft radioluminescent sources apply directly to the Apollo 
experience and a r e  discussed in detail. 
Radio1 u m i  nescent Sw i t ch  Tips 
Lunar module switch tips contain microspheres of promethium-147 bound with a 
phosphor that produces light by interaction with the short-range promethium-147 beta 
radiation. Originally, many switch tips were manufactured as type 19, and acrylic 
plastic enclosed the microspheres. The acrylic plastic sealed in the radioactive mate- 
rial and also shielded out the ionizing radiations while allowing the passage of light. 
Later, the f i r e  hazard from the acrylic plastic was recognized, the encapsulating mate- 
rial was changed to Kel-F plastic, and an  epoxy plug was used to seal the radioactive 
microspheres in a cylindrical hole within the Kel-F. The Kel-F/epoxy tips are desig- 
nated type 39. 
9 
1 
Type 19 tips were used on board the lunar module simulators where no flammabil- 
ity hazard existed because the atmosphere was not oxygen enriched. 
were equipped with type 39 tips. 
5 x 10 picocuries) because of radiation self-degradation of the encapsulation materials 
and subsequent leakage of promethium-147. No personnel injury was caused by these 
failures. However, cleanroom facilities were shut down for  a period of 14 hours before 
the launch of the Apollo 1 0  mission when several leaking tips onboard the lunar module 
required last-minute replacement. 
Flight vehicles 
Both types of t ips failed (leakage of more than 
3 . 
The problem of leakage was solved by encapsulating the microspheres in glass 
before sealing with epoxy in Kel-F. The resultant tip is designated type 59. The new 
type 59 tip has replaced all type 19 simulator tips and all type 39 flight-qualified tips. 
Radiol u m i  nescen t Pane ls  
Promethium-147 microspheres were used in a luminescent paint applied to  panels 
on the lunar communications relay unit and on the lunar roving vehicle. A thin coating 
of acrylic plastic was applied over the paint as a sealant. When the panels arrived at 
the MSC for testing, it w a s  found that the acrylic coating was too thin to reduce radia- 
tion levels to limits acceptable for  handling. The problem was solved by applying a 
layer of l/ls-inch Kel-F plastic over the panels during testing procedures. The plastic 
layer reduced the soft X-ray dose from an  initial value of approximately 1 3  rads/hr at 
a distance of 2 inches from the panels to an acceptable value of less than 0. 3 rad/hr. 
The panels were not considered hazardous to the crewmen during missions because the 
space suits provide more than the equivalent shielding of 1/16-inch Kel-F. Therefore, 
plastic covers were not required on flight units. 
Radiol u m inescen t L igh t i ng  
The portable life support system (PLSS) worn by the crewmen on the lunar surface 
has a remote control unit (RCU) that contains the controls and the quantity gages for  the 
PLSS. 
activated, glass-encapsulated, radioluminescent light sources imbedded in the polycar- 
bonate plastic top cover of the unit. These light sources were modified commercially 
available units (Beta lights). No external radiation was detected in association with 
the Beta lights. These lights have performed satisfactorily where indirect lighting can 
be used. Also, the Beta lights eliminate the external radiation problems and the effect 
on scientific measurements that occur when the promethium-147-activated systems are 
used. 
The requirement for  lighting the RCU was met by using small hydrogen-3- 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Apollo missions have not undergone any major space radiation contingency. 
However, the development of spacecraft dosimetry systems, the use  of a space radia- 
tion surveillance network, and the availability of individuals with a thorough knowledge . 
10 
of the space radiation environment have assured that any contingency would be recog- 
nized immediately and would be coped with in a manner most expedient for both crew- 
member safety and mission objectives. 
Routine radiation-protection problems dealing with manmade radiation sources 
have been solved by using standard health-physics procedures. Spacecraft 
radioluminescent-light-source problems were solved by improvement in shielding and 
containment of the promethium-147 isotope. It has been shown on the Apollo missions 
that the spacecraft and its crewmen have successfully avoided the large radiation doses 
that, before the Apollo missions, had been cited as a possible deterrent to manned 
space flight. Radiation doses to Apollo crewmen have been significantly lower than 
the yearly average of 5 r e m  se t  by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission for  workers 
who use radioactive materials in factories and institutions across  the United States. 
More significantly, Apollo astronaut doses have been negligible in t e rms  of any medical 
o r  biological effects that could impair the function of man in the space environment. 
Close coordination among mission planners, the Radiation Safety Committee, the Radio- 
logical Health Team, and the Radiation Constraints Panel ensures that radiation expo- 
su res  under nominal conditions will continue to remain minimal. 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
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APPENDIX 
SOLAR - PA RT I CLE-MON I TOR I NG NETWORK SYSTEM 
SOLAR PARTICLE ALERT NETWORK 
The Solar Particle Alert Network (SPAN) consists of three multiple-frequency 
radio telescopes and seven optical telescopes that a r e  operated under contract to the 
NASA. The SPAN provides data for  determining the severity of solar-particle events 
and the resultant possible radiation hazards to the crewmen. Solar-event data, when 
used for mission support, a r e  sent by teletype directly to the Space Environment Con- 
sole (SEC) at the Manned Spacecraft Center Mission Control Center. Radiation experts 
at the SEC evaluate the data and concurrently increase their watch of earth-based, sat- 
ellite and spacecraft radiation sensors  to determine early signs of particle-flux 
increase in  the earth/moon region. 
SOLAR FORECAST CENTER 
The Solar Forecast Center (SFC) is located in the North American A i r  Defense 
Command, Cheyenne Mountain Complex, Colorado Springs, Colorado, and is manned 
by personnel of Detachment 7, Fourth Weather Wing, Ent Air ,  Force Base, Colorado. 
Detachment 7 includes a worldwide Solar Observing and Forecasting Network (SOFNET) 
as well as the SFC. Personnel of the Fourth Weather Wing augment the staffs of sev- 
eral solar observatories. These observatories a r e  located at Sacramento Peak, New 
Mexico; Sagamore Hill, Massachusetts; South Point, Hawaii (SPAN site); Athens, 
Greece; Manila, Philippines; Teheran, I ran (SPAN site); and Los Angeles, California. 
The personnel a t  these SOFNET observatories, along with personnel at several  other 
cooperating observatories and agencies, maintain a continuous surveillance of the sun 
and send real-time solar and geophysical data to the SFC. These data a r e  received 
24 hours a day at the SFC and a r e  plotted and analyzed by the solar forecasters  on duty. 
On the basis of analysis of these reports, the SFC issues  four routine forecasts each 
day, an extended period forecast each week, and special-activity alerts. During Apollo 
mission periods, these forecasts  and a le r t s  a r e  sent to the SEC to aid support personnel 
in keeping track of solar activity. 
SPACE D I STURBANCE FORECAST CENTER 
The Space Disturbance Forecast  Center (SDFC) is a part  of the Space Disturbance 
Laboratory, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, and is located at 
Boulder, Colorado. The SDFC operates one of the seven SPAN optical telescopes and 
serves  as a collection point for  data f rom a number of monitoring stations located near 
Boulder. The SDFC is operated 24 hours a day and provides support to various Govern- 
ment agencies in the form of solar  forecast  prepared and sent out every 12 hours. In 
14 
addition to the 12-hour forecasts,  the SDFC will transmit other solar-activity data to 
the SEC during mission periods. Data will be transmitted by way of teletype through 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center o r  by telephone directly to the SEC. 
OPT1 CAL TELESCOPE SYSTEM 
The optical telescope system is used to observe and locate the major centers of 
activity on the solar disk. Solar eruptions o r  flares occurring in these active regions 
can be observed for  characterist ics associated with particle-producing events. When 
a solar-flare event occurs, it is recorded by a camera that photographs the solar disk 
as viewed through the telescope. Observations a r e  reported routinely to the SDFC in 
Boulder; and, during mission- support periods, telephone o r  radio reports a r e  made 
directly to the SEC in Houston. 
RAD IO-F REQUENCY TELESCOPE SYSTEM 
The RF telescope system will detect and record the intensity of solar radio emis- 
sions in the microwave region at frequencies of 1420, 2695, and 4995 megahertz. 
Observations are reported to the SDFC or ,  for optical events, to the SEC. The time- 
integrated radio emissions vary with the solar cycle. During periods of marked solar 
activity, outbursts of radio energy from two times to more than 50 t imes the normal 
background signal may occur for short periods usually lasting less than 3 hours. The 
simultaneous detection of an RF burst, at all three frequencies indicates the reception 
of synchrotron emission from electrons accelerated in the solar magnetic fields. Pro- 
ton acceleration and release of protons and other charged nuclear particles by the 
solar  event are implied when the RF synchrotron emission is detected. Approximately 
20 percent of such particle releases result in  the appearance of particles in  the earth/ 
moon region. 
R I OMETER SYSTEM 
The riometer (relative ionospheric opacity meter) system is a highly sensitive, 
ultrastable system operated for the NASA under support agreements for measuring in- 
tensities of electromagnetic fields. The riometer measures the changes in absorption 
of cosmic radio noise as it t raverses  the ionosphere. Such changes are caused by var- 
iations in electron density within the ionosphere brought about by solar atmospheric 
disturbances o r  high-altitude nuclear events. The electron density profile is a function 
of the spectrum of protons incident on the atmosphere causing ionization. Therefore, 
by using r iometers  at different frequencies, estimates can be made of proton f lux  and 
spectra. When required for  mission support, the system reports directly to the SEC. 
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